• Association of a Regional Health Improvement Collaborative with Rates of Ambulatory Care Sensitive Hospitalizations and Associated Costs (Tanenbaum, Cebul, Votruba, Einstader 2018)
• Behavior in Group Contests: A Review of Experimental Research (Sheremeta 2018)
• Loss Aversion and the Quantity-Quality Tradeoff (Rubin , Samek, Sheremeta 2018)
• Status and the Demand for Visible Goods: Experimental Evidence on Conspicuous Consumption (Clingingsmith, Sheremeta 2018)
• Trust, Reciprocity and Rules (Rietz, Schniter , Sheremeta, Shields 2018)
• Selective Recognition: How to Recognize Donors to Increase Charitable Giving (Samek, Sheremeta 2017)
• Facing Your Opponents: Social Identification and Information Feedback in Contests (Mago , Samak, Sheremeta 2016)
• Negative emotions, income, and welfare: Causal estimates from the PSID (Clingingsmith 2016)
• Principal-Agent Settings with Random Shocks (Rubin, Sheremeta 2016)
• The Paradox of Misaligned Profiling: Theory and Experimental Evidence (Kydd , Holt, Razzolini, Sheremeta 2016)
• The Pros and Cons of Workplace Tournaments (Sheremeta 2016)
• When Identifying Contributors is Costly: An Experiment on Public Goods (Samek, Sheremeta 2016)
• A Survey of Experimental Research on Contests, All-Pay Auctions and Tournaments (Dechenaux, Kovenock, Sheremeta 2015)
• Commitment Problems in Conflict Resolution (Rubin, Kimbrough , Sheremeta, Shields 2015)
• Divided Loyalists or Conditional Cooperators? Creating Consensus About Cooperation in Multiple Simultaneous Social Dilemmas (McCarter , Samek, Sheremeta 2014)
• Recognizing Contributors: An Experiment on Public Goods (Samak, Sheremeta 2014)
• Three-Player Trust Game with Insider Communication (Sheremeta, Zhang 2014)
• When Parity Promotes Peace: Resolving Conflict Between Asymmetric Agents (Kimbrough , Sheremeta, Shields 2014)
• Why Can’t We Be Friends? Entitlements and the Costs of Conflict (Kimbrough, Sheremeta 2014)
• Best-of-Three Contest Experiments: Strategic Versus Psychological Momentum (Mago , Sheremeta, Yates 2013)
• Building and Rebuilding Trust with Promises and Apologies (Schniter , Sheremeta, Sznycer 2013)
• Communication and Efficiency in Competitive Coordination Games (Cason , Sheremeta, Zhang 2013)
• Overbidding and Heterogeneous Behavior in Contest Experiments (Sheremeta 2013)
• Transparency, Efficiency and the Distribution of Economic Welfare in Pass-Through Investment Trust Games (Rietz, Sheremeta, Shields , Smith 2013)
• You Can’t Put Old Wine in New Bottles: The Effect of Newcomers on Coordination in Groups (McCarter, Sheremeta 2013)
• Fight or Flight? Defending Against Sequential Attacks in the Game of Siege (Deck, Sheremeta 2012)
• Perfect-Substitutes, Best-Shot, and Weakest-Link Contests between Groups (Sheremeta 2011)
• Can Groups Solve the Problem of Over-Bidding in Contests? (Sheremeta, Zhang 2010)
• Essays on Experimental Investigation of Lottery Contests (Sheremeta 2009)
• Mecca and Moderation (Clingingsmith 2008)
• Can Financial Incentives Help People Trying to Establish New Habits? Experimental Evidence with New Gym Members (Carrera, Royer, Stehr, Sydnor)
• Disruptive Organizational Simulation (Cohen)
• New Hampshire Effect: Behavior in Sequential and Simultaneous Multi-Battle Contest (Mago, Sheremeta)
• The Attack and Defense Games (Sheremeta)
• The Attack and Defense of Weakest-Link Networks (Kovenock, Roberson, Sheremeta)
• The Tug-of-War in the Laboratory (Deck, Sheremeta)
• “Management Practices, Relational Contracts, and the Fall of General Motors,” (Helper, )