OCBs and Citizenship Investment Behavior:

A Path from Social Exclusion towards Network Centrality

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Abstract:

Social exclusion can be viewed as a group’s declaration of rejection to individual members. Experiencing this behavior can lead an individual to disengage from the group, retaliate, or attempt to mend relationships with individual members of the group, as well as the group itself. However, how can a socially excluded individual, if they wish to mend relationships, successfully regain belonging into the group? While organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) has received considerable research attention, little research has explored its impact on the social status of the performer. By linking a subset of OCB, termed citizenship investment behaviors (CIBs)—which include behaviors that are significantly difficult for the individual to perform and are targeted to the group as a whole as opposed to individuals—to signaling theory, this paper proposes that CIBs, performed by socially excluded group members, may enhance social status because they provide benefits to the group, signaling desire to belong to the group, reduce information asymmetry about the performer, and display an abundance of individual resources. By enhancing social status, a socially excluded member may improve his or her experience within the group, and ultimately gain better access to the benefits generated by the group.
**Introduction**

In 2006, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor found that over a span of 25-years, individuals from the ages of 18 to 42 held 10.8 jobs, changing jobs on average once every 2.3 years (National Longitudinal Survey of Youth 1979). Changing jobs requires adapting to new organizational cultures and group norms. If a new job is with a global corporation, the complexity of adapting increases, sometimes requiring employees to adapt to working with people from very different world cultures, and in some cases even transferring to those countries. This context increases the risk that a new organizational group member, or even an experienced organizational member in a new group setting, might not fit into an organizational group and even be subject to rejection, ostracism, or social exclusion by the group. The threat of social exclusion will often impact the behavior of an individual, and in cases lead them to adopt behaviors that they believe are likely to be socially acceptable and that will increase the likelihood that they will gain social acceptance and inclusion (Williams, 2007). Group members acknowledge that the fear of rejection and exclusion is a motive for engaging in social behaviors (Williams, 2007). As such, social exclusion can be understood as being a part of a group’s arsenal for correcting the behavior of its individual members (Schachter, 1951). For individual members, the possibility of being subject to social exclusion generates a sense of insecurity and increases risks to their mental health (Baumeister & Leary, 1995; Smith, Murphy & Coats, 1999). Perhaps not surprisingly, the social exclusion of a group member generates secondary benefits for the group, such as greater cohesion (Gruter & Masters, 1986), which actually provides groups with incentives to exclude members that do not comply with norms. While findings provide evidence that
social exclusion, or its threat, impacts the behaviors of individuals within organizations, there has been little research that determines whether conforming to group norms will actually help the excluded member regain inclusion (Williams, 2007).

In the organizational behavior literature, organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) has received considerable attention over the last two decades (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000). OCB refers to behavior that is discretionary and that, in the aggregate, enhances organizational functioning (Organ, 1988). Empirically and conceptually, the behaviors that make up OCB have been separated into two broad categories of their intended beneficiaries: the organization as a whole or the individuals within the organization (Williams & Anderson, 1991). Both organizationally targeted OCBs and individually targeted OCBs have been linked to organizational compliance and altruism (Organ & Konovsky, 1989; Smith, Organ, & Near, 1983). Possibly because of this link to altruism, a large portion of the OCB research has explored why individuals engage in them (Podsakoff, MacKenzie, Paine & Bachrach, 2000). Some of this research has looked to determine the impact that engaging in OCB has on the allocation of organizational rewards, particularly in the form of performance evaluations (MacKenzie, Podsakoff, & Fetter, 1991; 1993; Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Hui, 1993). However, there has been little research focusing on the impact that OCB may have on relationships amongst coworkers, even though there are numerous reasons for this link (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006). One article (Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006) links the altruistic nature of OCB to signaling theory, which interprets altruistic behaviors as demonstrable and extravagant displays of competitive advantages. Because these displays are very difficult to falsify, they are powerful signals to the group, and generate prestige
for the performer, enhancing their social status within a group (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). From this perspective, altruistic OCBs become especially powerful behaviors for enhancing an individual’s social status within an organizational group.

In this paper I propose that OCBs targeting the functioning of the group, as opposed to enhancing individual member relationships, can be clustered into a subset of behaviors called citizenship investment behaviors (CIBs). These behaviors can also be linked together because they are less linked to direct and identifiable returns (e.g. social capital, social exchange, organizational rewards, etc.), making them appear to other organizational members as especially altruistic. Using the signaling theory framework, I propose that socially excluded members signal their desire to rejoin the group through OCB. I then generate propositions as to how CIBs enhance social status, and provide propositions on the process through which these behaviors can become a path for socially excluded group members to enhance their social status, and improve their experience and performance in an organizational.

The Individual Within the Group: Belonging and Group Membership

“Part of the human paradox is the cognizance of being entwined in social groupings, from dyads to society at large, yet necessarily separate---ultimately and existentially alone” (Schlachet, 1990: 205).

That humans are embedded in social settings is a premise of the social sciences. That humans have difficulty interacting with each other in those social settings is probably one of the starting points for research in social sciences. Biologically, humans are born into families, the original group, which would seem to indicate that being a part of a group
might be the default state for humans. As we grow through infancy and early childhood, we develop an individual identity, which, as Sehachet describes, is separate from the family and might seem to generate a paradox: we want to belong, but we are “ultimately and existentially alone” and need to tend to our self-interests. These two counterpoints, individualism and collectivism, pull and push against each other as individuals join with other individuals to come together as groups with a purpose, influencing the emotionality issues that Bion first identified in his group studies (1959). In joining a group, at some level individuals have to adapt their personal goals to accommodate not only their goals, and the goals of the group, but also the goals of other individual group members. From an economics perspective, individuals are recognized as primarily self-interested, and participate in groups to attain their interests. As Adam Smith wrote: “It is not from the benevolence of the butcher, the brewer, or the baker, that we can expect our dinner, but from their regard to their own interest” (Smith, 1904 [1776]). In general, however, group members will be less likely to accept members, and may even exclude members, if they identify that an individual is especially selfish and is not interested in the well being of the group (Williams, 2007).

When group members recognize that an individual “belongs” to the group, and is also interested in the well being of the group, then individuals can share in the resources of the group. Belonging to the group provides individuals with immense benefits. “There are no known societies in which most people prefer to live in social isolation […] Instead people prefer to live with each other in social groups. Culture improves the biological outcomes (survival and reproduction) of individuals, so people do what is required to belong to it” (Twenge, Baumeister, DeWall, Ciarocco, & Bartels, 2007: 56). A large
component of whether an individual belongs in a group rests on what the group knows, thinks, and feels about the member. An individual member’s reputation and social status are a function of these components.

**Reputation and Social Status: As Determinants of Social Network Position**

Within a set of social relations, or a social network (Adler & Kwon, 2002), an individual’s reputation is widely conceptualized as the group’s perception about the attributes of an individual (Bailey, 1971; Anderson & Shirako, 2008). To have a reputation is to be known for something (Emler, 1990). Reputation can be favorable or unfavorable, and is generated from an aggregate of prior interactions with or perceptions of individual members from the other members of the network (Wong & Boh, 2010). The reputation of an individual is a set of interconnected impressions shared and expressed by a large proportion of members of a defined social network (Bromley, 1993). Hence, both the number of connections an individual has within a network and the quality of those connections impacts the favorability of a reputation (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Empirical studies of reputation have conceptualized the strength of an individual’s reputation as the number of people who share the same belief about an individual within a single network (Wong & Boh, 2010). The more people in a social network share the same belief about an individual, the more prominent the individual and the stronger his or her reputation will be (Rindova, Williamson, Petkova, & Server, 2005).

Linked implicitly to reputation are the attributes upon which an individual’s reputation is built. Wong and Boh (2010) identify competence (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994), effectiveness (Tsui, 1984), and trustworthiness (Burt, 2005) as attributes that both impact and make up reputation within a social network. Another construct that has
received considerable attention in the social network literature, and is linked to reputation, is social capital (Adler & Kwon, 2002). Another factor that impacts reputation is third-party referral, or “bask-in-reflected-glory-effect” (Kilduff & Krackhardt, 1994: 89). For the scope of this paper, I will focus on social status, which is closely linked to reputation.

Social status has a very similar definition to reputation, but provides a framework upon which the quality of a reputation can be determined. Social status is bestowed upon group members on the basis of their apparent possession of attributes (e.g., competence, generosity) that are held as ideal by their social group (Flynn, Reagans, Amantullah & Ames, 2006). Status is a “function of the group’s collective judgments and decisions about which individuals deserve social status“ (Anderson, John, Keltner & Kring, 2001: 118). The group implicitly reaches a consensus as to which attributes are held as ideal and determine relative high and low status positions based on the possession of more positive attributes and less negative attributes (Anderson et al., 2001). In the literature, the difference between social status and reputation lies in the level of influence or control an individual has over group resources, conflicts, and group decisions (Berger, Rosenholtz, & Zelditch, 1980). A lower-status individual will often passively give up these benefits, deferring to the authority of higher status group members (Cheng, Tracy, & Heinrich, 2010). Considering the potential benefits for high status individuals, striving for status has been proposed as a primary and universal human motive (Barkow, 1975; Anderson et al., 2001).
The construct of social status is comprised of and has been empirically measured as the combination of an individual’s prominence, or received attention (Chance, 1967; Fiske, 1993; Anderson et al., 2001; Flynn et al., 2006); respect and esteem, or respect and regard that others have for the individual (Barkow, 1975; Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1989; Goldhamer & Shils, 1939; Anderson et al., 2001; Flynn et al., 2006); and influence, or the level of control over group decision and processes (Bales, Strodtbeck, Mills, & Roseborough, 1951; Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch, 1972; Anderson et al., 2001; Flynn et al., 2006). Within the group or social network, acquiring greater status becomes a function of both the individual’s personality and the group’s values and perceptions (Anderson et al., 2001). Implicit in status is that different group members have different levels of status. For the scope of this paper, I am focusing on socially excluded members who have been excluded by the group, and not members who have intentionally made a choice to behave in ways that excludes them from the group. This difference in choice implies that the socially excluded member will actively search for opportunities to regain inclusion back into the group, and wants to enhance their status in the group. Conceptually for this paper, social exclusion is not the absence of social status, but rather negative social status. These members, in a mapped social network, would have social positions that is the furthest away from the center. The implication here is that a member cannot positively leverage their reputation in the group to enhance their social status. This condition becomes pertinent for the premises on which some of the propositions in this paper are based.
Social Exclusion

Social exclusion, ostracism and rejection are essentially interchangeable terms for the exclusion of an individual member of a group by other group members (Williams, 2007). Social exclusion is defined as being excluded, alone, or isolated, sometimes with explicit declarations of dislike, but other times not (Twenge et al., 2001). It is the opposite of belonging, which “is a fundamental requirement for security, reproductive success, and mental health” (Williams, 2007: 427). Social exclusion has been linked to a decrease in displays of prosocial behaviors, but it is unclear which one causes the other (Twenge et al., 2007: 56).

While the intuitive behavior of an excluded group member may be to withdraw from or even harm the group, socially excluded and rejected individuals are capable of responding in a number of different ways (Williams, 2007). Many of these appear to be counterintuitive. For example, ostracized individuals can be more helpful, positive, and cooperative than other group members (Williams, 2007). Personal responses to social exclusion are moderated by individual differences and dispositions (Williams, 2007). These differences alter the meaning and urgency that can be attached to social exclusion, and guide individuals towards appropriate coping strategies (Williams, 2007). One of these coping strategies is to “tend-and-befriend” (Williams, 2007). This strategy guides individuals to think, feel, and behave in ways that can regain inclusionary status (Williams, 2007). As such, individuals will think or do things that they believe will help them be more acceptable to others in the group. In experiments, women were more likely to socially compensate in a ball-tossing exercise after being ostracized (Williams & Sommer, 1997); individuals with a high need to belong, or high in loneliness, were more
likely to have an improved memory for social information (Gardner, Pickett, & Knowles, 2005); and participants who were higher in need for belonging were more conscious of nonverbal cues (Pickett, Gardner, & Knowles, 2004). In another experiment, game participants who played over the Internet were more likely to conform to an incorrect but unanimous majority on a judgment task, than participants who were present (Williams, Cheung, & Choi, 2000: Study 2). Ostracized individuals were more likely to evaluate favorably, both a legitimate student group and an illegitimate group (Wheaton, 2001). This finding indicates that ostracized individuals regard others, with or without merit, more positively (Williams, 2007). After being subjected to ostracism by the group, game participants were more likely to display nonconscious mimicry of whom they conversed with, especially if that person was an in-group member (Lakin & Chartrand, 2005). Nonconscious mimicry has been shown to increase affiliation and rapport (Lakin & Chartrand, 2003). As well, studies show that following ostracism, individuals are more socially attentive (Gardner, Pickett, & Brewer, 2000; Pickett & Gardner, 2005; Pickett et al., 2004). The authors viewed enhanced social sensitivity as a means for improving success in subsequent social interactions (Williams, 2007). Evidence for “tend-and-befriend” is also supported by six experiments that showed that socially excluded individuals tried to establish new bonds with others and had more positive impressions of others, as long as the excluded participants anticipated face-to-face interaction with the others (Maner, DeWall, Baumeister, & Schaller, 2006).

Missing in the social exclusion literature, however, are experiments on how socially excluded members can regain inclusion (Williams, 2007). For those interested in mending relationships, enhancing social status may be a strategy for regaining inclusion.
To explore how one could enhance social status within an organizational group, I refer to signaling theory.

**Citizenship Behaviors as a Signal of Desire for Group Belonging**

*Signaling theory: Communicating to the Group*

Signaling theory identifies that costly (e.g. resource demanding), but collectively beneficial behaviors, such as public generosity or extravagant piety, are in fact a form of social competition (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). Individuals compete to be perceived as generous, with the most generous individuals gaining higher prestige (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). Behaviors of public generosity or extravagant piety are determined costly and extravagant because of they are very difficult to accomplish and falsify, and do not appear to generate a tangible return on investment to the actor. In the framework of signaling theory, the performance of a costly altruistic behavior displays true and verifiable information about the performer to the group (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). Essentially generosity conveys to the group that the performer has an abundance of resources. These resources (i.e. money or time) are highly valued by the group, and in turn, the investment of these resources on causes or individuals that do not benefit the performer, further enhance the performer’s prestige or social status within the group. Investments in social status are very expensive in economic terms, and increase social standing by displaying quality, which are in turn linked to the attributes of its members (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). The costly signal provides assurance that an individual has sufficient personal resource, or belongs to a group of sufficient resource holdings or productivity (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). This assurance is based on
the fact that some signals are simply “impossible to fake” (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005: 223). If the performer did not actually have the sufficient resources necessary for the costly signal, then the investment in symbolic capital would jeopardize the livelihood of the performer. The true power of these signals lies in the fact that they cannot be faked, that only a truly “wealthy” investor can perform them. These signals then are mutually beneficial to both the group and the individual, as they reduce information asymmetry about the performer, and provide the performer with social status within the group.

**Organizational Citizenship Behaviors as a Way to Rejoin the Group**

Organizational citizenship behavior was first defined by Organ as an "individual behavior that is discretionary, not directly or explicitly recognized by the formal reward system, and that in the aggregate promotes the effective functioning of the organization" (Organ, 1988). Through the considerable research developed between his article in 1988 and 1997, Organ adapted the definition of OCB to include “contributions to the maintenance and enhancement of the social and psychological context that supports task performance” (Organ, 1997). Organ identified two implications of the new definition: OCB “is less likely to be considered an enforceable job requirement, and it is less likely than task performance to be regarded by the performer as leading confidently to systemic rewards” (Organ, 1997). OCB from this definition can be understood as a contribution from an individual organizational member towards the organization, along with other individual members of the organization. Neither management, nor colleagues necessarily recognize the value or cost of the contribution provided by OCB, otherwise it would be institutionalized as a part of the job description, which indicates, in most cases, that OCB
is undervalued by the organization in comparison to task related activities (Bergeron, 2007). Empirical research has found that task related activities are more likely to result in organizational rewards (e.g. recommendation for rewards and monetary rewards) (Orr, Sackett, & Mercer, 1989; Van Scotter, Motowidlo, & Cross, 2000). An investment of time in a beneficial but undervalued and potentially unrecognized contribution also potentially cannibalizes the amount of time that is invested in task related activities (Bergeron, 2007). In the literature this personal sacrifice has been identified as a social dilemma (Joireman, Kamdar, Daniels & Duell, 2006; Bergeron, 2007). From this perspective, OCB can be seen as extremely costly to the individual, as it may not only be undervalued by the organization, but also consume personal resources that a performer could invest in activities that are highly valued by the organization. OCB could potentially generate personal and organizational costs that are more considerable than whatever benefits they were intended to generate. Nonetheless, research has found examples of OCB in organizations all over the world (Organ, Podsakoff, & MacKenzie, 2006), which has lead researchers to explore why organizational members engage in these behaviors.

In the literature, the motivation to perform OCB has been explained, among other things, as a result to job satisfaction (Bateman & Organ, 1983), organizational commitment (O'Reilly & Chatman, 1986), impression management (Bolino, 1999), social exchange theory (Adams, 1965; Blau, 1964) and regulatory focus theory (Dewitt & Denisi, 2007). In essence these theories explain employee motivation to display OCB as due to two primary reasons: self-serving, extrinsically motivated purposes (i.e. impression management) and other-oriented, intrinsically motivated goals (i.e. behavior
that benefits someone or something other than the individual) (Becton, Giles, & Schraeder, 2008). A self-serving motivation, i.e. impression management, would be intended to provide greater access to organizational rewards. But as OCB consist of “constructive or cooperative gestures” (Organ et al, 2006: 142), and is neither required nor contractually compensated, even if OCB is motivated by self-serving intentions, it is valuable as a signal of employee commitment to the organization (Grant & Mayer, 2009).

Shore, Barksdale and Shore (1995) found that engagement in OCB predicted managerial ratings of employees’ perceived commitment, and that these perceptions of commitment were positively related to both supervisor ratings of the employees’ managerial potential and promotability, as well as the supervisor’s response to employee requests for salary increases, training and performance feedback. Fandt and Ferris (1990) proposed that some self-interested behaviors on the part of employees may be beneficial to their organizations and that some prosocial behaviors may also benefit individuals. However, Eastman (1994) hypothesized that ingratiatory and citizenship behaviors look similar, but are differentiated by employee motive and by the perceptions of others, or both. The results of Eastman’s study indicated that a single set of extra-role behaviors could generate very different responses from supervisors. Employees labeled good citizens received greater rewards than other employees who were labeled ingratiators, or who did not exhibit extra-role behaviors (Eastman, 1994). Hence the same behavior may elicit very different responses from organizational members based on motive and perception.

Costly OCBs

Signaling theory identifies altruistic behaviors as costly signals to group members, and provides “a way to articulate idealist notions of the intangible social
benefits that might be gained through symbolic representations of self with more materialist notions of individuals as self-interested but socially embedded decision makers” (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005: 222). Deutsch Salamon and Deutsch (2006) also proposed a link between OCBs and signaling theory. They suggested that OCB is a means for highly capable employees to display their competitive advantage to the supervisors and gain better access to organizational rewards. By performing certain OCBs, employees can verifiably signal to organizational members that they possess competitive capabilities that would otherwise be unobservable (Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006). Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch defined these behaviors as costly because of their inherent costs to those who engage in it. This cost could be the combined burden of engaging in OCB and the task behaviors in their job description, or simply the inherent difficulty of a behavior that other organizational members are unwilling or unable to perform. Hence the burden of engaging in OCB filters out employees with inferior capabilities from engaging in these behaviors, and only those with superior capabilities can publicly afford the cost necessary to engage in them (Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006). In a competitive environment, the capabilities signaled by performing costly OCBs enhance the performer’s status with their supervisors, providing the performer with better access to organizational rewards. Under this framework, OCB becomes a costly signal that provides organizational members with verifiable information about the performer’s capabilities.

However, little research has looked at the potential impact that costly OCBs might have on coworker relationships. Two articles (Bowler, Haslenben & Paul, 2010; Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006) have made propositions about how coworkers might interpret
interpersonal OCBs. However, the focus of these propositions has been on coworker perception of OCBs that target supervisors, ultimately impacting coworker competition for limited organizational rewards. Both articles approach OCBs from the perspective of the supervisor, missing the possibility that self-serving OCBs could possibly be performed not for garnering organizational rewards, but instead targeting coworker relationships and gain group-level rewards, such as prestige, status, leadership, inclusion, and improved group relations. Indeed Organ, Podsakoff and MacKenzie (2006) found it “surprising that of the many reasons that TMX [the coworker relationship] might be expected to be related to OCB, […] to our knowledge no research has directly tested this relationship” (2006: 119).

In the framework proposed by Deutsch Salamon and Deutsch, OCBs are costly signals displayed for the attention of the supervisor. Nonetheless, in numerous cases the immediate beneficiaries of these behaviors are individual coworkers, which establishes a link between these behaviors and the perception that coworkers have on the performer. In the literature, social exchange theory through friendships has been linked as an antecedent to some OCBs (Bowler & Brass, 2006, Hypothesis 1A), stemming from a desire to generate interpersonal social capital within a network (Bowler & Brass, 2006, Hypothesis 1B). From a social network perspective, not only the behavior performed is important, but also the beneficiary of the targeted OCB.

However, if an OCB is perceived to be altruistic and cannot be falsified, then an OCB can be a costly signal, generating prestige benefits to the performer from coworkers. Just as supervisors use OCB to determine an employee’s organizational commitment (Shore et al., 1995), coworkers could determine a coworker’s commitment
to the group based on the engagement of group targeted OCBs. These OCBs could be perceived by coworkers as signals of a member’s desire to be in good standing with the group. A socially excluded member could then, by engaging in group targeted OCBs, signal their intent to rejoin the group.

**Proposition 1: OCB is a way for excluded group members to signal their desire to rejoin the group.**

**Interpersonal Citizenship Behavior**

Interpersonal citizenship behavior (ICB) “occurs when coworkers assist one another beyond their job requirements in such a way that results, either directly or indirectly, in enhanced individual job performance and ultimately contributes to group and organizational functioning” (Bowler & Brass, 2006: 70). ICB is a subset of the broader OCB term, differenced from other OCBs because the behaviors are specifically directed towards individual organization members. In essence, ICBs have a different target, another individual organizational member, than organizationally focused OCBs (Bowler & Brass, 2006). In the decision to engage in ICB, the performer chooses a recipient among all the other organization members, which makes the motivation behind the performance pertinent to other organizational members. Bowler and Brass (2006) concluded that both social exchange theory and impression management drive the performance of ICB, while in contrast to organizationally targeted OCB, the performance of ICBs did not relate to job satisfaction, commitment, and procedural justice. Empirical research has provided support for the notion that employees use OCB for “instrumental purposes” (Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006: 189), and ICBs would seem to be the clearest display of this intention. An ICB targeting a supervisor establishes a social
exchange relationship between the performer and the supervisor, possibly enhancing an individual’s access to organizational rewards. Pointing to the instrumental application of OCB, Podsakoff, MacKenzie, & Bommer (1996) in a meta-analysis found that when employees were indifferent to organizational rewards they were less likely to engage in OCB. And this instrumentality may not go unnoticed by coworkers.

Bowler, Halbesleben and Paul (2010) provided propositions about the competition for rewards that Deutsch Salamon and Deutsch (2006) identified. Bowler et al. proposed that the display of costly signals directed towards the supervisor, in a competitive organizational context, will be attributed by coworkers as negative and self-serving impression management behavior (Bowler et al., 2010, Proposition 3). This attribution is primarily based on the interpersonal directionality of the behavior, which generates an increased intensity in competition for organizational rewards. But, if OCBs are not directed towards the supervisor, and instead target the functioning of the group, then coworkers might attribute these OCBs to positive, prosocial and altruistic behavior, and enhance the social status of the performer.

**Proposition 2: Coworkers will attribute OCBs directed towards enhancing the functioning of the group as altruistic and prosocial behaviors.**

In direct contrast to ICBs, which have an implicit social exchange component (Bowler & Brass, 2006), OCBs not directed towards individual members, and instead towards all coworkers as a collective, run the risk of generating little leverageable social capital for the performer. In this perspective, group targeted OCBs are considerably more costly than ICBs, or OCBs that target other organizational components (i.e. OCBs targeting the direct output of the firm). These behaviors signal to the group a considerable
and transparent desire to belong to the group that cannot be faked. The motive for engaging in those behaviors could still be perceived as impression management by coworkers. However, because they intend to manage the impression of the group, they signal that the performer places a high level of importance to the group, and still be perceived positively. This characteristic of group targeted OCBs provides great utility for a socially excluded group members. Enhancing the social status of a socially excluded individual can reduce the negative reactions linked to exclusion (Williams, 2007), and improve their group experience. However, for a socially excluded group member to choose to invest in the group through OCBs, they must have a considerable desire to mend or improve their relations in the group.

**Proposition 3. Social exclusion, moderated by a desire to mend relationships within a group, is an antecedent to group targeted OCBs.**

**A path from Social Exclusion towards Network Centrality: Citizenship Investment Behaviors**

ICBs are a subset of OCB, but while instrumental in enhancing interpersonal impression management (Bowler & Brass, 2006), could negatively impact the social status of an individual with their coworkers (Bowler, et al., 2010). Coworkers can perceive these costly behaviors as displays of competitive advantages that garner organizational rewards (Deutsch Salamon & Deutsch, 2006). I propose that citizenship investment behaviors (CIBs), which are OCBs that target the functioning of the group of coworkers, can be instrumental in enhancing an individual’s social status within a group. CIBs are a subset of OCB, made up of what would be considered as the most altruistic...
citizenship behaviors identified in the literature: following group norms (Smith, Organ & Near, 1983; Graham, 1991; Van Dyne, Graham, Dienesch, 1994; Williams & Anderson, 1991; Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 1997; Van Scotter & Motowidlo, 1996), organizational loyalty (Graham, 1989; 1991; Van Dyne, Graham, Dienesch, 1994; Morman & Blakely, 1995; George & Brief, 1992; George & Jones, 1997; Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 1997; Podsakoff et al. 2000; Fahr, Zhong, & Organ, 2004), good sportsmanship (Organ, 1988; Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 1997; Podsakoff et al., 2000), courtesy (Organ, 1988), attending group activities (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 1997; Graham, 1991; Van Dyne, et al., 1994), maintaining a clean and neat workplace (Farh et al., 2004), loyal boostering (Graham, 1989), and volunteering to carry out tasks activities (Borman & Motowidlo, 1993; 1997). Direct examples of these behaviors would include: wearing a group-designated shirt on a specific day (following group norms); agreeing with group interests (organizational loyalty); not complaining about negative outcomes of a group decision (good sportsmanship); treating other group members with common respect (courtesy); going to an after hours coworker organized event (attending group activities); cleaning up conference room after a meeting (maintaining a clean and neat workplace); arguing for group interests with supervisors (loyal boostering); and organize a gift exchange event at the end of the year (volunteering to carry out tasks activities).

CIBs, like OCBs, are investments from individuals to the collective (Organ, 1988), but because they target the group, are investment behaviors that appear to other organizational members as less linked to direct and identifiable organizational rewards, (e.g. promotions, performance evaluations). They can, however, be linked to group level rewards, such as social status. Using the framework of signaling theory, the more
extravagant the CIB appears to other coworkers (e.g. time consuming, complicated), the more the behavior displays an individual’s potential value to the group (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005). Members identified with greater resource abundance, while receiving greater social status, also appear to bring new resources to the group. However, this perception depends on the motivations coworkers attribute to the behavior (Eastman, 1994). Even behaviors that target the functioning of the group, if perceived to be impression management, can be seen as disingenuous and a display that looks to establish competitive advantages in the competition for group level rewards (e.g. leadership, influence on other group members, control over group resources). However, by categorizing CIBs by the components of social status they enhance, an individual may better understand how these behaviors impact social status.

Social status, as defined in this paper, has four components: worth to the group; prominence in the group; respect from other group members; and control or influence over group resources. Analyzing the eight CIBs identified in this paper from a signaling theory perspective, all of the eight CIBs target the enhancement of the functioning of the group, generating benefits to the group. As well, the eight CIBs display an individual’s abundance of personal resources and display a desire to belong to the group. Benefiting the group, displaying an abundance of resources, and wanting to belong to the group enhance an individual’s worth to the group. Entrenched in these displays is an impact on the performer’s reputation, reducing information asymmetry (what is not known by the group about an individual), which enhances the prominence of the performer in the group.
However, of the eight CIBs, only two behaviors (e.g. loyal boostering and volunteering to carry out task activities) enhance the last two components of social status (e.g. respect of other members and control or influence over group resources). However, to successfully perform loyal boostering or receive group support for volunteering to carry out task activities, an individual has to have some prior level of legitimacy within the group. Other members must recognize that a group member has a place in the group before loyal boostering will enhance social status. If an individual without this legitimacy, such as a socially excluded group member, argues for group interests, such a display might be perceived as self-serving or disingenuous. Because loyal boostering implies at some level an ownership in the group, the group could interpret an illegitimate member trying to usurp leadership in the group. Trying to organize group activities can generate the same perception, as it requires that the individual engage in behaviors that display some control and influence over group resources and decisions. As such, before organizing a group event or arguing for group interests, the performer must display that they belong to the group. This belonging can be linked to simply complying to the norms of the group. The first six behaviors of CIB display not only a desire to belong to the group, but also direct compliance to group norms.

Consequently, I propose that there are two types of CIBs, different in the components of social status they enhance. The first type captures six behaviors: following norms, organizational loyalty, good sportsmanship, courtesy, attending group activities, and maintaining a clean and neat workplace. I have categorized these six behaviors as general compliance CIBs, which enhance two components of social status: worth to the group and prominence.
Proposition 4A. General Compliance CIBs enhance social status because they display a member’s worth to the group by:

a. Providing benefits to the group.

b. Being a “costly signal” of an abundance of individual resources.

c. “Costly signal” of a desire to belong.

Proposition 4B. General Compliance CIBs enhance social status because the performer becomes more prominent to other group members through:

a. Reducing information asymmetry about the performer.

The second category of CIBs can be labeled as civic virtue, and includes the last two behaviors: loyal boosting and volunteering to carry out tasks activities. Like general compliance, civic virtue displays an individual’s worth to the group and increases prominence. Civic virtue also provides benefits to the group, is a “costly signal” of an abundance of individual resources, and is a “costly signal” of a desire to belong, as well as reduces information asymmetry. However, because civic virtue behaviors link the performer more closely to the group, pointing towards control over group resources and decisions, they enhance the two other components of social status. Unlike general compliance, entrenched in civic virtue are displays of the respect other group members have for the performer, as well as displays of the control and influence a member has over resources of the group. Civic virtue impacts these aspects of social status because they display an individual’s commitment to championing the group, to the point of
investing more personal resources for behaviors that primarily benefit of the group at the expense of personal outcomes.

**Proposition 5A.** Civic virtue CIBs enhance social status because they display a member’s worth to the group by:

a. Providing benefits to the group.

b. Being a “costly signal” of an abundance of individual resources.

c. “Costly signal” of a desire to belong.

**Proposition 5B.** Civic Virtue CIBs enhance social status because the performer becomes more prominent by being a:

a. Reducing information asymmetry about the performer.

**Proposition 5C.** Civic virtue CIBs also enhance social status because they display the level of respect other group members hold of the performer, as well as the level of control the performer has on group resources. These factors of social status are impacted through a costly display of their commitment to championing the group.

While CIBs provide a means through which any group member can enhance their social status, a socially excluded group member, with negative social status, must cancel out the negative perception that other members have of them. In this sense, engaging in CIBs, even if perceived as impression management, will display a desire to mend their relations within the group. Displaying a desire to belong to the group is a first step in working to enhance the social status of a socially excluded member. As such, they must first display general compliance, and only after canceling their negative social status and establishing belonging through compliance, can they engage in civic virtue that will generate social status. To counter the negative social status that social exclusion entails, a
socially excluded group member must competently display general compliance to the
group for as long as is necessary. Clearly there are numerous reasons for why a group
will exclude a member, and the necessary length and intensity of the general compliance
will depend on the gravity of the context. Social exclusion, or its threat, is one of the
group’s means for correcting the behavior of its members (Williams, 2007), and whether
the member is accepted back into the group will depend on how willing and able the
member is to change their behaviors. Displaying general compliance sets the socially
excluded member towards the path of acceptable group behavior and generates social
status. If the excluded group member does not display general compliance, and instead
directly attempts to displays civic virtue, the group may see these behaviors not as
genuine or appropriate costly signals. However, by first displaying the seemingly more
prosocial, less self-interested, and more costly general compliance, the performer can
earn enough social status and legitimacy within the group. They then can use this social
status as a foundation upon which civic virtue will be seen as an appropriate costly signal
and enhance social status. Without general compliance, civic virtue would not be
recognized as prosocial, less self-interested, and costly, but instead as a member’s
illegitimate attempt to usurp control over group resources.

**Proposition 6.** A socially excluded group member must first establish belonging to
the group through general compliance so as to enhance social status. Only after they
have displayed the necessary level of general compliance, will performing civic
virtue enhance their social status.

**Discussion**
Drawing on the empirical evidence from the social exclusion and ostracism literature, I argue that socially excluded group members who desire to mend group relations in an organizational context, will display prosocial behavior in the form of OCB. OCBs, viewed from a signaling theory perspective, are particularly powerful displays of an individual’s desire to mend group relations because the group members see them as costly signals that cannot be faked. CIBs, by their altruistic characteristics, are seen as the costliest of OCBs, and hence would provide a possible path for the enhancement of social status in a group. However, for CIBs to enhance the social status of a socially excluded member, the behaviors need to be performed in order of which factors of social status they enhance, otherwise performing CIBs will potentially worsen social status. A socially excluded member would first have to perform general compliance CIBs, which display a member’s worth to the group and enhance prominence within the group, and only after successfully establishing general compliance, members could then perform civic virtue CIBs, which build on a member’s worth to the group and their prominence, and display the respect recognized by other members and the control over group resources that a member has.

The framework proposed in this paper builds on the notion that performers of OCBs are aware that OCBs have an impact on the perception of other organizational members, particularly in relation to organizational rewards (Podsakoff et al., 1993). As most organizational rewards are allocated based on the quality of the relationship with the supervisor, the focus of OCB research has been on the impact of OCBs on the relationship with the supervisor. OCB research has essentially focused on performance evaluation as the outcome of OCBs (Podsakoff et al., 2000). However, impression
management, one of the main motivations recognized by the OCB literature for the performance of OCB, is not only perceived by the supervisor, but by as many organizational members that see the display. As such, the engaging in OCB not only impacts the quality of the relationship with the supervisor, but also the relationship with coworkers. As Bowler, Halbesleben, & Paul (2010) proposed, coworkers will tend to interpret the OCBs directed towards the supervisor as impression management, and see the performer as a “brownnoser”. In the signaling theory literature, such a display is interpreted as a sign of competition for group resources (Bliege Bird & Alden Smith, 2005), which could negatively impact the social status of the group member. For the scope of this paper, I have focused on the worst social status, social exclusion, because it provides a blank canvas devoid of social status generated from other sources or behaviors. By exhausting all prior inventories of social status, the impact of CIBs on social status can more easily be identified.

The propositions of this paper specifically focus on the quality of the group context and exclude the supervisor from the equation. I have done this because I want to include relationships with other organizational members in the outcomes of OCB research. In many cases the OCBs that are performed for the sake of the supervisor are directed towards coworkers, and this could factor into the decision to perform the behaviors. A performer has a choice of which OCBs they perform, and the fact that they choose to target the group, as opposed to individuals or a supervisor, points to other motivations. Even if these motivations are prosocial or impression management, they are displays of a desire to help the group, or gain group rewards (i.e. social status), as opposed to organizational rewards (i.e. promotions, salary increase). Adding this
component to the discussion of OCBs broadens the understanding for why individuals are willing to invest in the social context that could help facilitate in-role task behaviors. As researchers and organizations expands the definition of in-role behavior to include concepts of quality of life and family conflict (Kossek & Ozeki, 1998), simply getting along better with coworkers in an organization helps lessen stress factors, improve employee health, reduce turnover, as well as enhance productivity (Kossek & Ozeki, 1999). Ironically, by first enhancing their social status, a group member may be able to behave in ways that are more natural to them, and less part of group norms.

**Future Research**

The propositions in this paper open numerous avenues of research in OCBs. Initially it would be necessary to establish whether CIBs are different from other OCBs, in particularly whether they are understood as more costly signals by other organizational members. These differences could be explored at the individual level from the perspective of the performer (difference in the motivation to perform), other individual group members (whether they value CIBs differently, or whether they assign different interpretations to CIBs than other OCBs) or a supervisor (whether the supervisor recognizes a difference, and what value they place on CIBs in performance evaluations). As well CIBs could be measured at the group level, exploring whether the group values CIBs differently than other OCBs, particularly impacting the four factors of social status. If a difference is determined, it would be necessary to determine whether there is a difference between general compliance and civic virtue CIBs, based on whether they impact different factors of social status, as this paper proposes.
Another research avenue would be to determine how the group interprets altruistic OCBs, and whether they enhance the social status of the performer. This would entail determining whether a member’s social status, either high, low, or negative (exclusion), is enhanced by performing altruistic OCBs, or whether there are boundary conditions where one type of OCB will enhance social status while another OCB will not. Also, as some of the CIBs are contextually defined, i.e. following norms, it would be important to determine whether performing CIBs that are counter to group norms reduce social status. For example, would acting courteous reduce social status if the group’s norm were to be confrontational?

Finally, exploring these propositions within the framework of social networks might help determine practical applications within an organization. Researchers could operationalize social status as network centrality, and determine whether OCBs and CIBs increase and enhance the network connections of members who are at the edge of the network.

**Conclusion**

This paper proposed a subset of OCBs, Citizenship Investment Behaviors, which are behaviors that generate benefits to the group, and are valued by group members. These behaviors, as other OCBs, could be perceived as costly signals to other group members that the performer has a desire to belong to the group, and in the process reduce information asymmetry by displaying an abundance of individual resources. These qualities of CIBs may provide a path for socially excluded members to enhance their social status, but only if they first display general compliance to the group, and then further enhance their social status by displaying civic virtue. In a world where
individuals are more likely to have numerous jobs during their career, or work in culturally different organizational environments, the risk of not fitting in an organizational group, or even being subject to exclusion or the threat of exclusion, is greater. Being excluded from the group impacts a member’s access to group resources and can negatively impact their emotional and physical health, as well as their performance in task behaviors that are dependent on other group members. The predictions in this paper may help provide a path for socially excluded professionals who wish to enhance their social status and improve their group experience, potentially reducing turnover and increasing organizational productivity.
References


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Figure 1. Proposition 3.

Proposition 3. Social exclusion, moderated by a desire to mend relationships within a group, is an antecedent to group targeted OCBs.

Figure 2.

Citizenship Investment Behaviors (CIBs)

- General Compliance
  - Following Group Norms
  - Organizational Loyalty
  - Good Sportsmanship
  - Attending Group Activities
  - Courtesy
  - Maintaining clean workplace

- Civic Virtue
  - Loyal Boostering
  - Volunteering to carry out task activities
Figure 3. Propositions 4A and 4B.

Citizenship Investment Behaviors: General Compliance

**General Compliance**

- **Enhances:**
  1. Benefits to the group.
  2. “Costly-signaling” desire to belong.
  3. “Costly-signaling” of abundant individual resources.
  4. Reduces information asymmetry.

- **Social Status:**
  1. Worth to Group
  2. Prominence
  3. Respect
  4. Control/Influence

Figure 4. Propositions 5A., 5B., and 5C.

Citizenship Investment Behaviors: Civic Virtue

**Civic Virtue**

- **Enhances:**
  1. Benefits to the group.
  2. “Costly-signaling” desire to belong.
  3. “Costly-signaling” of abundant individual resources.
  4. Reduces information asymmetry.
  5. Championing.

- **Social Status:**
  1. Worth to Group
  2. Prominence
  3. Respect
  4. Control/Influence