An Exploration of the Aftermath of Crisis and its Implications for Stereotypes, Prejudice and Discrimination

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On September 11th, 2001 at 8:30 p.m., President Bush issued the following words.

“These acts of mass murder were intended to frighten our nation into chaos and retreat. But they have failed. Our country is strong. A great people has been moved to defend a great nation. Terrorist attacks can shake the foundations of our biggest buildings, but they cannot touch the foundation of America. These acts shatter steel, but they cannot dent the steel of American resolve (Krupa, 2001).”

Despite Presidents Bush’s strong affirmative speech the American people displayed increased fear and chaos ensued in the coming days and months. Even seven years after the attack there remains a multitude of daily reminders of the events, such as radio and television broadcasts of terror alert signals and long lines in airports. Many have drawn a parallel to the “day of infamy” the attack on Pearl Harbor, December 7th 1941 (Kaplan, 2006). Both attacks were devastating events that left an indelible image in the minds of Americans. In these incursions there were clear perpetrators and victims where the perpetrators were ethnically distinct from the majority of the victims. This paper will provide evidence for the notion that the existence of ethnically distinct perpetrators led many to discriminate against individuals who bore a resemblance to the perpetrators. Both attacks caused an outgrowth of resentment toward those ethnically linked to the perpetrators which resounded throughout the country and left a lasting negative sentiment.

Since the terrorist attacks there has been a great deal of research that has attempted to predict and control human acts of terror. Math and science techniques have been created as well as computer simulations, in order to gather information on terrorist activities (Palca, 2007). Though researchers have made strides in these areas, they are still incapable of predicting and
eliminating terrorism. With no possibility of removing threats of terror, the public is forced to reckon with the aftermath of attacks and the anti-social behavior that often follows (Greenberg et al., 1990). However, we are unable to control the antecedents of chaos, we can attempt to examine and manage the human response to it.

In both September 11th and Pearl Harbor what becomes evident is the way in which individuals react to crisis. In studying these reactions research has traditionally looked at the symptoms of post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), however this paper will not focus on the pathology or the associated symptoms. Instead, it will take a social-psychological approach and examine how and why individuals are susceptible to stereotype formation, prejudice and discrimination in the wake of crisis (Greenberg et al., 1990). Stereotype, prejudice and discrimination have varying definitions depending on the context and the author. This paper will provide a definition for each in order to delineate between the terms. The term stereotype will be defined as negative beliefs that members of one group share regarding attributes of another group. Prejudice will be defined as a negative judgment or evaluation that is widely shared by individuals in society regarding members of a particular group; these judgments are often accompanied by feelings of aversion and hostility. Discrimination will be defined as illegal behaviors that target members of a particular group and often exclude those members in societal functions and prevent them from attaining resources (Allport, 1954; Hogg & Cooper, 2003).

These terms follow a progression such that stereotyping occurs first and can lead to prejudice which can then lead to discrimination. Stereotyping transforms into prejudice when the individual not only holds negative beliefs of others, but uses these beliefs as a basis to judge and evaluate others on. Discrimination is the transition to actualizing the negative beliefs into negative behavior and transgressing illegal actions. For instance a male manager may hold the
stereotype that females are less intelligent than men. This belief manifests into prejudice when the manager gives his female employees less challenging work based on his stereotype that the females are incapable of providing the same level of quality of work that males are capable of providing. This manager becomes guilty of discrimination when he blocks the promotion of his female employees. This action illegally targets a specific group and denies members of the group access to beneficial resources and opportunities for advancement.

The term stereotype is often referred to in a neutral light. In daily discourse, people attempt to qualify the term by stating whether they are talking about negative stereotypes or positive stereotypes. This paper will take the position of interpreting stereotypes as negative beliefs and will investigate the differences in greater depth when reviewing social identity theory.

The paper will begin by offering evidence of the stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination that occurred after September 11th and Pearl Harbor. It will then provide three theories that explain peoples’ propensity to stereotype, exhibit prejudice and discriminate in the aftermath of crises, where there are clear perpetrators and victims (henceforth this will be referred to as *post-crisis prejudice*). A fourth theory will elaborate on the various responses to crises and will elucidate on the behavioral patterns of people who are more likely to exhibit post-crisis prejudice. Of the various theories that explain human behavior and interpersonal conflict, these theories were chosen because they provide the closest explanations of post-crisis prejudice. They consider the interpersonal aspects in addition to the crisis factor. However in the seventy articles and books reviewed there was no research that specifically looked at the increase of prejudice of perpetrators of a crime by the victims of the crime.
Social identity theory (Tajfel, 1970; Hogg and Tindale, 2001), uncertainty-identity theory (Hogg, 2007; Hogg and Tindale, 2001) terror management theory (Greenberg et al., 1990), all include key concepts for understanding the development of prejudicial behavior. Social identity theory provides an explanation of the cognitive processes involved in the formation of stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination. However, it does not offer specific information on the condition of a crisis and its affect on the formation process. Uncertainty-identity theory builds on the core concepts of social identity theory and provides an account of the motivation behind social identity. In particular the theory will demonstrate how uncertainty in the environment causes people to identify with a group, often resulting in stereotype formation, prejudice and discrimination. Though uncertainty-identity’s theoretical basis yields a closer understanding of post-crisis prejudice, it does not specify the nature of a crisis per se. Terror management theory’s basic premise is that individuals allay their fear of death by adhering to belief systems and when individuals are reminded of their mortality they cleave to their belief system and derogate others with conflicting beliefs. The paper will show that of the three theories, terror management provides the nearest account of post-crisis prejudice.

While the three theories offer a comprehensive view of post-crisis prejudice, they do not account for personality variables that most likely affect the differences in people’s propensity to discriminate. The paper will offer attachment theory as a further interpretation of post-crisis prejudice. After which Fosha’s (2000) adaptation of the theory will be reviewed and applied to the range of behaviors exhibited after September 11th. Additionally the concepts associated with social identity, uncertainty-identity and terror management will also be applied to September 11th and Pearl Harbor. The below chart presents the four theories’ central themes, how they relate to post-crisis prejudice and how they compete or add to each other.
Theoretical Explanation for Post-Crisis Prejudice

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theory</th>
<th>Explanation</th>
<th>Additive/ Competitive</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Social Identity Theory (SIT)</td>
<td>Explains the cognitive formation of social and self categorize and how they produce stereotypes, prejudice and discrimination</td>
<td>Slightly competes with TMT’s cognitive explanation of proximal and distal factors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty Identity Theory (UIT)</td>
<td>Explains that people social and self categorize in order to reduce uncertainty and reestablish order</td>
<td>Adds to SIT by explaining the motivation for social and self categorization</td>
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</table>
| Terror Management Theory (TMT)      | Explains how being reminded of one’s death prompts one to derogate others with differing beliefs | • Competes with SIT and UIT for explanation of the process of prejudice and discrimination formation  
• Lacks a strong cognitive explanation such as SIT, but tries to compensate with its theory of proximal and distal reactors  
• Lacks explanation of stereotype formation |
| Attachment Theory (AT)              | Explains how children with particular attachment styles are more or less likely to engage in prejudicial behavior | • Looks at Post-Crisis Prejudice from a personality perspective rather than a cognitive (SIT, UIT) or existential (TMT) perspective  
• Adds to TMT by showing moderating affect of attachment style on responses to mortality reminder |

Aftermath of Crisis

“fire in the city air and I feared for my sister’s life in a way never before. And then, and now, i fear for the rest of us.
first, please god, let it be a mistake, the pilot’s heart failed, the plane’s engine died. then please god, let it be a nightmare, wake me now. please god, after the second plane,
please, don’t let it be anyone who looks like my brothers. i do not know how bad a life has to break in order to kill. i have never been so hungry that i willed hunger i have never been so angry as to want to control a gun over a pen. not really. even as a woman, as a palestinian, as a broken human being. never this broken (Zogby, 2002).”

The poem by Suheir Hammad encapsulates the angst that many Arab Americans felt in the days following September 11th. When the media disclosed the hijackers’ identities Arab and Muslim Americans grew concerned that the public would harbor resentment toward them for sharing the same religion and cultures as the attackers (Zogby, 2002; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006). Regrettably these portentous fears were not unfounded for Arab and Muslim Americans became the targets of vicious prejudice and discrimination in the subsequent months.

It is difficult to capture the subtle biases that seeped into the public’s sentiment regarding Arab and Muslim Americans. However this paper will provide supporting evidence of the development of prejudice and discrimination. The 2002 Human Rights Watch and 2001 Federal Hate-Crime Statistics reports present proof of the discriminatory actions taken against Arab and Muslim Americans. Further discrimination is evidenced by the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) creation of “code Z” (Babcock, 2006). This code was created by the U.S. government to protect the rights of Arab and Muslim Americans in the workplace as the prejudicial hostility ensued. A final note will be made regarding the presence of stereotypes in the media (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006).

A Human Rights Watch report which was released a year after the terrorists attacks (Human Rights Watch, 2002), documents the backlash of anti-Arab and anti-Muslim violence. The report highlights a number of murders, assaults, strikes on places of worship and arson attacks. One appalling account tells the story of Rien Said Ahmed’s murder. Ahmed had been harassed since the second week of September 2001 and received countless death threats. Then
on October 2nd four males entered his convenience store and opened fire on him. Similar gruesome accounts were repeated throughout the country supporting the notion that in the wake of crisis some people responded by exhibiting vicious anti-social behavior.

The Hate Crime Statistics Act, passed by Congress in 1990, was a product of the Civil Rights Movement and mandated the collection of information regarding aggravated crimes against a person’s race, religion, sexual orientation, and/or ethnicity/national origin. This act was passed in response to the outbreak of anti-gay violence that erupted in the late 1980s. Since the early 1990s the reports have closely monitored the fluctuation of discriminatory violence. The 2000 report detailed 33 anti-Islamic hate crimes, followed a year later by a 1,550% spike resulting in 546 crimes. These crimes included 296 incidents of non-violent intimidation, 123 crimes involving Muslim owned property, 93 assaults, 18 accounts of arson, 7 thefts, 5 burglaries and 2 robberies (FBI, 2006; Kaplan, 2006).

In addition to targeted counterattacks, many Arab and Muslim Americans were forced to endure prejudice and discrimination in the workplace. An article published in September of 2006 by the Society of Human Resources Management (SHRM) alerted human resources professionals to the widespread discrimination occurring. The article reports that a new code, “code Z” was instated, by the government, under Title VII to assist in tracking these specialized instances of post September 11th discrimination against Arabs, Muslims, Middle-Easterners, South Asians and Sikhs. Of the 991 charges, 148 of them received large sums, totaling $4 million. David Grinberg, a spokesman for the U.S. Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC) in Washington, D.C., explained that an EEOC charge is an employee’s final option. This statement leads one to wonder about the many Arab and Muslim employees who chose to endure the anxiety and distress rather than file an EEOC charge.
The Babcock article (ibid, 2006) also reported the results of an August 2006 SHRM survey that measured prejudice in the workplace. The survey was distributed to 368 United States human resource professionals and asked them to evaluate the rise or decline of prejudice against Muslim employees in their organizations. Of the 368 respondents, 75% said negative attitudes have remained static since September 11th, 16% said there was an increase and 9% reported a decrease. Further statistics presented by the article tell of a USA Today/Gallup poll released on August 9th. The results showed that “four out of ten Americans harbor negative feelings or prejudices against people of the Muslim faith living in the United States.” Of the 1,007 adults polled 39% admitted to prejudicial attitudes and a third of respondents presumed Muslims to be sympathetic to al-Qaeda beliefs (ibid, 2006).

While the above statistics offer support for the growing prejudice within the general public, it is additionally important to note the presence of stereotypes in the media. Nacos and Torres-Reyna’s 2006 book, Fueling our Fears: Stereotyping, Media Coverage and Public Opinion of Muslim Americans recounts the rise of Arab and Muslim stereotypes in newspaper articles and television programs in 2001 and 2002. The authors acknowledge that stereotypes existed prior to September 11th and report that directly following the events there was a surge in positive news coverage of Arab and Muslim Americans. They attribute the latter to President Bush and then Mayor Guliani’s plea that the public refrain from directing their anger “toward ethnic and religious minorities” (p. 20). However, this positive sentiment did not remain, rather in the later part of 2002, negative characterization of Arab and Muslim Americans became prevalent in the media. After coding newspaper articles and television news programs for negative stereotypes the authors found that in the six months before the one year anniversary of
September 11th there was an 8% decrease of positive characterization and a 16% increase of stereotypes.

These figures attest to the growing prejudice by the public toward Arab and Muslim Americans. The media’s influence on public opinion is undeniable and often contributes to the collective unconscious. A Jungian term, the collective unconscious refers to the existence of a universal mind. In Jung’s classic text, *The Archetypes And The Collective Unconscious* he states that the collective unconscious is separate from the individual mind and is instead a repository of centuries worth of religious, spiritual and mythological symbols and experiences (Singer, 2000).

This concept is of prime importance when discussing the rise of prejudice since September 11th. The presence of a collective unconscious can be seen in the Gallup pole and SHRM surveys statistics and the rampant stereotyping in the media. The concept allows for an understanding of the public’s overwhelming prejudicial response after the terrorist attacks.

The presence of the collective unconscious was also present in America after the bombing of Pearl Harbor, when Japanese Americans endured great discrimination. Dissimilar from the experience of Arab and Muslim Americans, the Japanese were discriminated against by the United States government as well as the public. President Roosevelt’s Executive Order 9066 of February 19, 1942 authorized the internment of Japanese, German and Italian Americans. Of the 120,000 total detainees 75% were Japanese Americans.

It is difficult to ascertain the extent of Japanese discrimination during and after World War II, since there was no official documentation such as hate-crime statistics. Additionally, the United States government “took care of the job” (Kaplan, 2006) by removing the Japanese from the public and incarcerating them behind barbed wire. There are, however a few poignant quotes that depict the likely sentiment that Americans felt for the Japanese. General John L. DeWitt,
head of the West Coast Defense Command and overseer of the Oregon and California internment camps was quoted as saying “A Jap’s a Jap…It makes no difference whether he is an American citizen or not… I don’t want any of them…There is no way to determine their loyalty (Blum, 1976, p. 159).” Another distressing statement was issued in the Los Angeles Examiner by columnist Henry McLemore “Herd ‘em up, pack ‘em off…let ‘em be pinched, hurt, hungry and dead up against it” and added for those who missed his point “….I hate Japanese (ibid, p. 158).” Responses like these, reinforce the imperative of studying post-crisis prejudice and its contributing factors.

SOCIAL IDENTITY THEORY:
A COGNITIVE PERSPECTIVE

Social identity was a groundbreaking theory initially developed by Henri Tajfel in the 1950s and 1960s (Tajfel 1959, 1969, 1978; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). Tajfel, a Jewish Holocaust survivor, devoted his studies to discovering the psychological underpinnings of social group formation and group discrimination. The theory attempts to explain an individual’s desire to belong to a specific group, emotionally connect to the group and attach significant value to the group (Hogg, 2007).

In the 1970s Henri Tajfel collaborated with John Turner and further refined the theory (Tajfel & Turner 1979) moving from how social identity forms to why it forms. The theory argues that the central motivation of associating with an identity group is to positively enhance one’s sense of self. People achieve this by either joining groups that they consider to have positive significance or by ascribing positive significance to a group that society places one in due to race, ethnicity, gender or other social classifications (ibid, 1979). For instance a young
Chinese male student in the United States voluntarily associates with his Chinese background because he admires the Chinese characterization of being determined, disciplined and intelligent. Conversely the boy is relegated to a Chinese identity group by his fellow students and teachers and is compelled to then ascribe the positive characteristics to his Chinese identity.

Tajfel and Turner went on to empirically test the conditions involved in social identity formation and intergroup behavior discrimination. The theory provides the underlying constructs in which one can understand the emergence of prejudicial behavior in the wake of crises. The paper will examine the social identity constructs involved in the cognitive processing of social stimuli, especially those which are specific to the formation of stereotypes and prejudice. These constructs include classification, categorization, social-categorization, prototype, self-categorization and depersonalization. Tajfel’s and Turner’s studies explored various conditions that increased and decreased intergroup discrimination. While these studies are of high import they will not be reviewed in this paper as the paper is interested in the initial stages of social identity creation and how it relates to post-crisis behavior.

Categorization lies at the core of the cognitive aspect of social identity. However before delving into categorization it is important to understand the construct of classification which temporally precedes the categorization process. The concept of classification was originally researched by Bruner and describes how people learn to catalog objects (Bruner & Goodnow, 1956; Mervis & Rosch 1981). Building on classification, categorization is described as the process whereby one distinguishes between relevant and extraneous information and integrates the important information into an existing framework. In this early stage of cognitive development, children begin to group objects together and create schemas in which they can view the world. A common example that is used to illustrate the process of categorization is the
construction of a defined animal. For example, something with four legs, a tail and fur is conceived as an “animal”. Upon further development this “animal” is labeled as a dog and differentiated from other animals such as, horses and cows. In time the dog is seen as being part of a particular breed and consequently a member of that class (Hogg & Tindale, 2001). This cognitive process is a critical step in organizing external stimuli and creating a conceptual mapping through which to view the world.

In addition to arranging objects and concepts, categorization is also activated when the mind tries to interpret social stimuli (Hogg & Tindale, 2001). Tajfel outlined the process of social-categorization in his early works, stating that there is an accentuation process that occurs when people respond to social stimuli. The individual conceives the actual stimuli as exaggerated, where perceived differences between groups and perceived similarities within group are amplified (Tajfel, 1959; Tajfel & Wilkes, 1963). For example, when encountering Pakistanis, Indians and Bangladeshis, Americans tend to group these people into one category and often refer to them homogenously as Indians. While grouping the other nationalities together the Americans will exaggerate the differences between their own accent, skin color and mannerisms from those of South East Asians. Yet, during this interaction Americans from Tennessee, Texas, New York and California will amplify their similarities to each other in contrast to the Pakistanis, Indians and Bangladeshis.

Building on the notion of exaggerated similarities, the *illusory correlation effect* describes how people have a tendency to associate distinctive or unusual characteristics (McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1994). This concept of associating distinct attributes is highly applicable to stereotype formation which the paper will later demonstrate.
Another concept, essential to the formation of stereotypes and prejudice, is that of prototypes. A prototype is defined as a vague model consisting of a set of similar characteristics held by most of the people in a given group (Cantor & Mischel, 1979). The shared characteristics comprise the groups’ perceptions, attitudes, feelings and behaviors. These attributes are seen by both ingroup and outgroup members as distinctive from the characteristics of opposing groups (Hogg, 2005). The *metacontrast principle* explains the processes of social-categorization and prototype formation more accurately, such that the ratio of perceived intergroup group differences to intragroup differences are maximized (Tajfel, 1959). When the ratio is high the ingroup and outgroup boundaries are more defined, so are the groups’ defining characteristics. The principle also accounts for the strength of the prototype, which is weakened or intensified by its comparison to other groups. Expanding on the previous example if a group of American students encountered South East Asian students, the American students would most likely be characterized as loud, independent and entrepreneurial. These characteristics would form a strong American prototype when contrasted with South East Asians students who do not generally display these characteristics. If the American group is composed of second generation immigrants than the members of the group will most likely display differences therefore decreasing the *metacontrast* ratio and dissolving the prototype. However if the American group is made up of students with similar backgrounds, they will most likely display alike characteristics maximizing the intergroup differences to the South East Asian group and minimizing the intragroup differences in the American group; therefore strengthening the *metacontrast* ratio.

It is important to note that no one group member exhibits all of the prescribed characteristics that are attributed to a group either by insides or outsiders; rather members
fluctuate in the extent to which they embody the whole set of attributes (Smith & Zarate, 1992). As members become aware of their ingroup’s prototype, they begin to compare their personal characteristics to the group’s prototypical features. This process is termed self-categorization and refers to the tendency to moderate one’s self-concept to align with the characteristics of the ingroup (Turner et al., 1987). Furthermore as people self-categorize they perform a number of measures to ensure a full group membership. These measures consist of self-assignment of ingroup attributes, self-stereotype, adherence to group norms and reconstruction of the self-concept in the image of the ingroup. Like the concept of prototype, acceptance and internalization of these measures vary between people. Though in order to identify with a group socially, individuals must incorporate some if not all of the stated measures.

The concept of depersonalization is tightly linked to social-categorization, self-categorization, and prototypes. Some researchers consider stereotype to be synonymous with depersonalization, for both terms describe the act of viewing a person as a category rather than an individual with distinct characteristics (Hogg & Cooper, 2003). Yet others use this explanation to refer to depersonalization alone and specifically state that stereotype by definition includes the negative objectification of others (Allport, 1954; Tajfel 1969; Hogg, 2005). Though recent researchers are attempting to transform the term stereotype to represent a neutral cognitive process, it is unlikely that the connotation will change (Hogg & Cooper, 2003). For the negative association with the word has become indelibly ingrained in common thought and literature. Henceforth this paper views the terms as separate with depersonalization providing the definition of objectification and stereotype providing a negative interpretation of depersonalization.

When depersonalization is activated, people perceive others as categories or objects without human features which progresses to stereotyping which can then lead to anti-social
behavior and dehumanization (Zimbardo, 1970). It is important to note that deviant behavior is only a product of depersonalization and stereotyping when the associated prototype stipulates such behavior (Hogg, 2005). A recent example of this occurred during the Rwandan genocide, when Hutu officials used the national radio to incite violence against Tutsis. Referring to Tutsis as *inyenzi* or “cockroaches” Hutu broadcasters prompted their followers to view Tutsi victims as less than human, as insects (Li, 2004). This characterization coupled with the call to murder, led to the victimization and slaughter of 800,000 Tutsis (Cyprian, 1998).

Just as people depersonalize and stereotype others, they also depersonalize and stereotype themselves. This is a crucial step in understanding ingroup-outgroup discrimination, because it explains the unconscious act of stripping oneself of individuality in order to become part of a larger group or reference group.

The term reference group was originally used in Sherif’s early research on groups (Sherif, 1935) and specifically refers to groups that individuals relate to on an abstract level. Furthermore, the theory asserts that individuals assume the goals and values of the group and incorporate the characteristics of the group into their self-identities (Sherif & Sherif, 1969). While psychologists and some social-psychologists refer to this greater group as a social identity group, sociologists and other social-psychologists refer to it as a reference group. The disparity between the terms can be reconciled by looking at the focal point of the process. It appears that social identity initially concentrates on the individual and then extends outward to the individual’s association with a larger group. Alternatively, reference group primarily looks at the formation of a conceptual group and then explains how individuals are affected by the group. While other differences may exist between the terms this paper is more concerned with how the terms can broadly be applied to the actions and perceptions of post-crisis prejudice.
Application of Social Identity Concepts

In the events following September 11th and Pearl Harbor, many Americans saw themselves as being part of a larger group, a nation of victims. Using a social identity lens, one could say that in these post-crises, Americans were vulnerable and lacked self-esteem or were outraged by the attack and disdainful of the attackers. In an attempt to bolster their sense of self they sought out a social identity group or a reference group. To fully comprehend the evolution of the perceived groups, the concepts involved in the theory must first be explored and applied.

The United States of America was established as a country of immigrants. Since its inception the country has benefitted and struggled because of its immigrant population. The benefits lay in the diverse cultures and array of thought that propelled the country to superpower status. Nonetheless it is the range of cultures, religions, ethnicities and races that have also crippled the nation. Years of racism and bigotry between the various groups caused the country to become a segmented society, privileging selected groups and disadvantaging many others.

September 11th and Pearl Harbor, both show that despite the presence of many deep divides the majority of groups came together to form one a single group in their response to these incidents. It is undeniable that the circumstances in both episodes were tragic, however instead of viewing the differences between their prescribed groups people suddenly began to unite under an umbrella of patriotism (Li & Brewer, 2004). The ever-present subcategories were temporarily forgotten. The prior self and social-category boundaries momentarily disintegrated and a new all encompassing group coalesced, where the members identified as proud Americans.

Unfortunately, this colossal formation was at the expense of the perceived perpetrators of the crimes. After Pearl Harbor, Americans viewed Japanese Americans as a distinctly different
category, similarly Arab and Muslim Americans were viewed as a unique category after September 11th. The people in these groups were seen as categories rather than individuals and were therefore seen as encompassing the same attributes as the perpetrators of the ghastly crime.

The *illusory correlation effect* further explains the negative categorization that leads to stereotype formation and is evident in the wake of September 11th. Prior to the oil hikes in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Arab and Muslim men were not particularly associated with violence. However as anti-Arab and Muslim sentiment rose the two unusual stimuli were linked together. This linkage was strengthened in the months following September 11th and has become pervasive in American media ever since (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006). Excluding television exposure, the average American does not come into contact with either Arab and Muslim men or violence on a daily basis and therefore do not have real life experiences to base this association on. This adds credence to the claim that the vast stereotyping of Arab and Muslim as violent is due to both media influence (ibid, 2006) and the *illusory correlation effect*.

As the negative characteristics of Arab and Muslim Americans formed so did the affirmative characteristics of Americans. In the weeks following September 11th (Li & Brewer, 2004) Americans began to self-categorize themselves as proud and resilient (Li & Brewer, 2004). It was not long before both these newly created ingroup and outgroup prototypes became emblazoned on the minds of the members.

The various murders committed against innocent Arab and Muslims in the days following September 11th (Human Rights Watch, 2002) attest to the presence of depersonalization. Rien Said Ahmed was not seen as an individual but as a category associated with violence and hatred. Japanese-Americans were also depersonalized and dehumanized when they were rounded up and forced into internment camps (Blum, 1976).
At the core of social identity is the yearning to belong to a group. In the days following both events, people sought out the comfort of others and swiftly identified with others as Americans. Yet this desire soon led people to identify those with similar ethnic, national and religious characteristics of the perpetrators as perpetrators themselves. This forced identification has had major repercussions for innocent people and has fueled a great amount of prejudice and discrimination.

**Uncertainty-Identity Theory**

Michael Hogg, a widely published author and researcher of social identity, (Abrams & Hogg 1988; Hogg, Terry & White, 1995; Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg & Tindale, 2001; Hogg & Cooper, 2003; Hogg, 2005; Hogg & Reid, 2006) developed the uncertainty-identity theory to explain why people are motivated to identify with social groups. The theory suggests that people are drawn to subscribing to identity groups as a way to reduce, control and protect themselves from feelings of uncertainty about or related to the self (Hogg, 2007). For instance, most people find the first day of a new job to be anxiety provoking. People are uncertain of how to behave around others, what the accepted norms are and what others expect from them. In situations like this one, where the uncertainty is stressful, people grab onto already formed structures such as identity groups. In doing this knowledge of the group norms gives the new hires a script to follow. Being aware of these group rules reduces the uncertainty and lowers anxiety.

Building on the notion of self-categorization, Hogg hypothesizes that subscribing to a category aids the individual in organizing random objects. This enables an individual to create a framework of the world where there is predictability and a consistency (Hogg & Tindale, 2001).
Predictability has been a source of much comfort for humans throughout their evolution (Hogg & Mullin, 1999). One could assert that reducing a feeling of uncertainty is a prime motivation of humans (ibid, 1999). People want to be able to predict how to behave around others and particularly what to expect from others and what others expect from them.

This prediction process is facilitated by self-categorization in that it instructs people how to behave appropriately in their ingroups. Yet, self-categorization does not occur in a vacuum; rather it is almost always accompanied by social-categorization (Hogg, 2007). As people self-categorize to reduce uncertainty they also social-categorize others, using the logic that like themselves others also conform to ingroup prototypes to reduce uncertainty. When these logical leaps are made individuals are able to use the outgroup prototypes to guide them through unfamiliar interpersonal situations. The desire to self-categorize and social-categorize is amplified during times of heightened uncertainty, when people are especially vigilant in attempting to reestablish order and meaning (Hogg & Mullin, 1999; Hogg & Tindale, 2001).

Building on the previous example of an employee’s first day in a new job, there is a high tendency for the entrant to place his or her new colleagues into social groups. These groupings could be classified by hierarchical level, such as management and administration. One may group others by race, so that African Americans are placed in one group, Whites in another and Hispanics in a third group. Another possibility could be by the universities coworkers attended or even by those who attended university and those who did not. The variety of social groupings are endless, but what this exercise represents is the cognitive processing an individual undergoes in order to reduce his or her anxiety around social interaction. When encountering a member of the “management group” the new hire is no longer frozen by uncertainty of proper conduct,
instead the entrant uses prototypes associated with those in a management position to guide the interaction.

In situations of increased uncertainty, self-categorization and social-categorization can result in stereotyping and can often lead to prejudice and discrimination (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). While it is true that this procession is not necessary or inevitable it is highly likely. Paul Grieve and Michael Hogg (Hogg, 2007) conducted an experiment to ascertain whether categorization and uncertainty lead to ingroup bias. The study included 105 subjects in a random 2(categorization) X 2(uncertainty) design and looked at categorized and non-categorized subjects in elevated and reduced uncertainty conditions. Those categorized were given a subject code and a group label and those not categorized were only given a subject code. In the elevated uncertainty condition the researchers used the Thematic Apperception Test and asked participants to write down what they thought was happening in each of the five ambiguous pictures. Conversely in the reduced uncertainty condition, participants were given unambiguous pictures, such as photos of daily life, and asked to write down what they thought was happening. The researchers then conducted a manipulation check where they asked all sets of subjects to rate how certain or uncertain they were on their descriptions of the pictures and their performance in the task. This check was executed in order to ascertain the subjects’ uncertainty levels. The subjects were then asked to perform a minimal group allocation task. Taken from the Tajfel design, subjects were asked to allocate resources to a group of subjects. Those in the categorized condition were first asked to recall their assigned group code and review a page showing the subjects classified by subject codes and group codes. Those in the non- categorized condition were immediately given the task, where they were asked to distribute the resources. The results showed a significant ingroup bias among categorized subjects under the elevated uncertainty
condition, supporting the contention that high uncertainty and self-categorization lead to prejudice and discrimination.

Grieve and Hogg state in their 1999 article that uncertainty reduction must extend outside the lab and be examined in society “where people belong to real social groups” and must contend with dynamic environments and imposing forces such as economic turmoil, being in a foreign culture and becoming unemployed. They also stress that uncertainty reduction can lead individuals to join orthodox belief systems and totalistic groups with anti-social aggressive practices (Grieve & Hogg, 1999). The authors’ description of the behavior predicated by their theory proved to be alarmingly similar to the events that occurred two years later after the twin towers were hit.

The Fulfillment of Uncertainty-Identity Theory

The negative effects of the uncertainty-identity phenomenon discussed in the preceding section are palpable when one considers American behavior in the days after both attacks. While many Americans channeled their anxiety into acts of kindness and courage, there were many who acted on their rage and resentment. Yet, in these times of high uncertainty there were many who sought to recover from the tragic events by regaining a sense of order. According to uncertainty-identity theory, people achieved this reorder by self-categorizing.

Grieve and Hogg provided evidence in their experiment that showed how high uncertainty led to ingroup bias and could lead to prejudice and discrimination (Hogg, 2007). Their hypotheses were supported under real life conditions in the aftermath of both Pearl Harbor and September 11th. Striving to reduce their uncertainty, many people self-categorized and stereotyped those they saw as threatening. The initial stereotypes were reinforced by the media
(Blum, 1976; Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006) and eventually led to discriminatory actions taken by the government. These actions came in the form of the Executive Order 9066 of 1942, which forced Japanese into internment camps and the present day Patriot Act of October 2001, passed as a law to assist in deterring terrorism. While the Patriot Act is not discriminatory by nature, many (Amnesty International) saw the act’s broad autonomy as a precursor of future inequitable treatment. The Act has various stipulations that infringe on civil liberties. However, the most appalling provision is that it permits non-citizens to be detained without any charge and imprisoned for an indefinite amount of time once charged. Extreme examples, like these, support the hypothesis that individuals enact drastic measures to reduce uncertainty and restore order in the face of chaos and confusion.

**Terror Management Theory**

Terror management theory was developed in the late 1980s by social-psychologists Jeffrey Greenberg, Sheldon Solomon and Tom Pyszczynski. The theory aims to explain the motivations and behaviors of individuals when confronted with the awareness of mortality. Integrating the works of great theorists such as Becker (1962, 1973), Freud (1929), Lifton (1976) and Rank (1941), the authors look at the existential dilemma of immortality. In particular the authors build on cultural anthropologist, Ernest Becker’s classic book *The Denial of Death*. In this text Becker examines the evolution of fear. Like animals, humans are designed to stay alive and handle threats to existence. When there is a threat, both animal and human experience fear of death. Though, unlike animals, humans have the intellect to understand that amidst their best efforts they will not survive and death is inevitable. This in effect, causes an ever-present potential for anxiety.
Terror management theory posits that humans are forced to keep the potential for anxiety under control. This is accomplished by creating a significant existence in a permanent symbolic reality (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). For example, people refrain from thinking of themselves as animals facing their inevitable deaths and instead view themselves as graduate students conducting research in a scholarly institution. Living in a symbolic reality masks feelings of mortality anxiety and allows people to go on living without being caught in a perpetual state of fear (ibid, 1997). This creation also provides individuals with meaning, values and a sense of security and immortality.

As humans evolved and learned to live in symbolic realities they developed stories, myths and beliefs that aided in the abatement of fear of mortality. These collective beliefs helped to shape societies and cultures where the members all ascribed to similar beliefs (Greenberg, et al., 1990). The existence of cultural worldviews allowed people to feel safe from the fear of mortality (ibid, 1990).

Worldview refers to one’s basic beliefs about the world. The authors build on this notion and create the term worldview defense which refers to one’s desire to feel one’s worldview is correct. For example, people who consider themselves Christian will want to believe that Jesus is their savior, therefore if someone disagrees with this belief the Christian proponents will want to defend the belief of Jesus and derogate the non-believer (Greenberg et al., 1990; Schimel et al., 1999, Nelson, Moore, Olivetti & Scott, 1997).

The studies referred to below support the notion of worldview defense by showing evidence of a strong causal link between reminders of death, referred to as mortality salience, and cleavage to one’s belief system (Greenberg et al., 1990; Jonas, Fritsche & Greenberg, 2005). In order to prove the worldview concept the researchers exposed subjects to reminders of death
and asked the subjects to evaluate items representing value consistency or inconsistency. In the first study (Greenberg et al., 1990) the researchers experimented with religiously distinct groups of Christian and Jewish students. Each group was split in two, where half of the group received the experimental treatment and half did not. Those in the experimental half had their mortality primed by being given a questionnaire asking them to describe their imminent death. Those in the control group received a control topic questionnaire which did not ask participants to describe their death and hence mortality was not primed. Each student was then asked to evaluate a Christian student and a Jewish student. The researchers found that the control subjects evaluated each subject equally. However, the mortality primed subjects gave a higher evaluation score to those matching their religious beliefs and a negative score to those with oppositional beliefs. The results of mortality primed students showing ingroup bias, provide strong evidence for the claim that mortality salience leads to discrimination.

In another study (Pyszczynski et al., 1996) German nationals were interviewed regarding their positions on a new proposal that would block the immigration of foreign nationals. This experiment was conducted in the mid-1990s following reunification after the fall of the Berlin Wall, when the topic was highly controversial. The researchers questioned subjects in front of a funeral home, which served as the experimental condition, and a short distance away of 100 meters, which served as the control condition. Subjects were first asked to state their stance on immigration and whether they were in favor of the policy or against it. Next they were asked to estimate the percentage of Germans who agreed with them. As predicted, subjects in front of the funeral home attributed a higher percentage to be in agreement with their stance. Moreover this percentage allocation was even greater for people who held the minority point of view, of being against the proposal and in favor of immigration. This result confirmed the notion that those
who are made aware of their mortality and those in the minority have a stronger need for consensus regarding their convictions.

In Schimel et al. (1999), the researchers conducted five studies testing their belief that mortality salience increases stereotypic thinking. The studies examined stereotypes based on nationality, race, gender and sexual orientation. In the first study American students illustrated that when mortality was primed there was an increased need to corroborate stereotype-consistent views of German traits. Conversely when students were not primed they were more likely to attribute stereotypic-inconsistent views of German traits. The second study expanded on the outcomes of the first study and found that students exposed to mortality salience exhibited a greater need to explain stereotype-inconsistencies regarding behaviors that deviated from sex role stereotypes. In contrast to this, students not exposed showed little need to explain stereotype-inconsistencies.

In the third study, students primed for high mortality salience and presented with an African-American confederate, who exhibited stereotype confirming or disconfirming characteristics. The researchers asked the same African-American confederate to present himself in three ways to different sets of raters. In the first, the confederate was instructed to behave and dress with stereotype consistency. In the second he displayed stereotype inconsistency and the third was a control variable and the confederate exhibited stereotype neutrality. The subjects were then asked to rate their inclination to be friends and “get to know” the confederate. Results showed that subjects who were primed with mortality showed a greater preference for the stereotype consistent confederate over the stereotype inconsistent confederate.

The fourth study presented identical results but used the conditions of male and female job applicants. In the final study the researchers used Kruglanski’s NFC scale a personality
variable scale that measured the subjects’ propensity for structured cognitive processing versus free flowing thought. The researchers found that the subjects who were primed with mortality salience and required more structured thought exhibited a greater preference for a stereotype-confirming feminine gay man over a stereotype-disconfirming masculine gay man. This study overlaps with the concept in uncertainty reduction theory, in that those with a stronger need for structure and order showed a greater propensity to stereotype.

It is in the last study that the researchers began to emphasize variability in personality and demonstrated how it can affect stereotypic thought. The researchers readily admit that more research needs to be conducted around personality variables and terror management theory (Schimel, et al. 1999). However, this research has yet to be done (Navarrete & Fessler, 2005). While there seems to be a lot of evidence that supports the causal effect between mortality salience and stereotypic thought, it is important to note that in light of personality variability this research must be considered as inconclusive.

While the authors do not account for personality variability they do explain the contributing factors of worldview defense. They state that a main motivation for subscribing to a worldview is to boost self-esteem and lower anxiety. There have been many studies that show the negative correlation between anxiety and self-esteem, such that low self-esteem is associated with high anxiety and high self-esteem is associated with low anxiety. Moreover many studies have found that increasing self-esteem results in reduced anxiety (Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Greenberg, 2003). In adhering to a worldview it causes a chain reaction where anxiety is lowered, which leads to a decrease of fear of death which results in a bolstering of self-esteem.

After a mortality salience event, there are two main defenses that help individuals reduce their anxiety. On a conscious level people activate a proximal defense and on an unconscious
level they initiate a distal defense. A proximal defense is when people consciously push the thoughts of death into their subconscious. This is done by distracting oneself from thoughts of death. This is easily done by turning on the television or engrossing oneself in a book. People also allay such anxiety by altering the characteristics of a threat, such as the severity level and the temporal remoteness of it. Lastly, people attempt to deny their vulnerability to the threat.

A distal defense is when the fear of death is no longer on the individual’s mind but is still highly accessible. The manifestations of this response are derogation of those who violate or contest one’s worldview and enhancement of those who validate the worldview. It is this reaction, the distal defense, which best explains post-crisis prejudice.

**Mortality Salience Attacks**

Since September 11th there has been considerable research linking terror management theory to aspects of the attacks, such as the rise in patriotism (Landau, et al. 2004), the reelection of President Bush (ibid, 2004), the relationship between September 11th anxiety levels and subsequent bolstering of worldview defense (Osborn, Johnson, & Fisher 2006) and the terrorists’ motivation for the attacks (Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003). Furthermore the authors Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg immediately applied their theories to the events and in 2003 published *In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror.*

In the book the authors explain how the events of September 11th supported the research they had conducted during the previous ten years in lab settings. The attacks primed the entire country with mortality salience. Seeing the towers burn and fall horrified and frightened the public. Anxiety levels shot up in the ensuing days, as people began to fear that they could be murdered without warning. According to the theory this terror also created a proximal defense.
In a study conducted by Yum & Schenck-Hamlin (2005) two weeks after the attack on a Midwestern university campus, students responded that they initially reacted to the attacks with fear and disbelief. Other proximal responses could be seen by those people who surmised that another attack would not occur for awhile. New Yorkers tried to allay their fears by presuming that the terrorists would not hit the same location twice. Conversely, people in the South and the Mid-West deduced that a lack of national symbols would deter the terrorists from striking in their region.

As the proximal defenses subsided the distal defenses became active (Yum & Schenck-Hamlin, 2005). In distal defense people alleviate fear of death by reinforcing a worldview defense. The hate-crime (Kaplan, 2006) and media statistics (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006), presented earlier provide supporting evidence for this theory. In order for Americans to reduce their anxiety, many of them reacted by acting out against those who appeared to challenge their worldview. Accordingly to many, Arabs and Muslims represented a threat to American beliefs of freedom and nationalism (Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003). These feelings were misdirected as many Arabs and Muslims were also victimized by the attacks. In fact quite a few Arab and Muslim Americans were killed in the towers and/or when they assisted as fireman and aid workers (Zogby, 2002).

This reaction was similar to the aftermath of Pearl Harbor. One could assert that the reaction to Pearl Harbor would be less severe, since the attack was targeted at a military ship off of U.S. mainland and henceforth not a random assault. Nonetheless, it came as a major surprise to the nation and created a considerable amount of panic. This fear increased when millions of families were suddenly faced with the knowledge that their fathers, brothers and sons would be forced to fight in a war where they might die. The draftees were confronted with the idea that
they were facing their death. According to terror management theory, this heightened fear of death provoked many to stereotype and discriminate against Japanese citizens.

Though the terror management theory seems to cogently explain much of the behavior surrounding September 11th (Solomon, et al., 2004), it has recently incurred harsh criticism from evolutionary psychologists. Navarrete and Fessler (2005) dispute two major assertions of the theory. First, they take issue with the premise the theory is based on, the survival instinct. Whereas terror management theory states that the survival instinct leads people to support a worldview defense, Navarrete and Fessler assert that organisms, animals and humans respond to threatening stimuli on a need specific basis. When confronted with a threat to survival, the organism responds appropriately to that specific threat, it does not use one all encompassing method to ward off death, such as a worldview defense, as the authors of terror management theory would reason. The second argument questions the notion that engaging in a worldview defense would alleviate anxiety. Navarrete and Fessler state that religion often generates great stress. Many people associate a negative connotation with their religion and being reminded of it would presumably cause a greater amount of anxiety. However one might argue that the authors of terror management theory would contest this argument, stating that not all people insert their religion into their worldview defense, rather people insert their belief system. For example, those who oppose religious ideals might substitute a philosophical outlook into the worldview. Navarrete and Fessler undeniably raise critical questions regarding the consistency of the theory. However, it is also important to note the compelling ideas put forth by terror management and the large research following it has gained. Nevertheless in order for terror management to gain entrance into the social-psychology canon, Greenberg, Solomon and Pyszczynski, need to tighten many of their concepts and provide an overall more conclusive argument.
A Research Need for Personality Variance

While there are apparent gaps in the terror management model, the theory provides the closest explanation of the motivations behind post-crisis prejudice. Appendix A illustrates how the three theories address post-crisis prejudice. Social identity theory provides a complete and specific explanation of the formation of stereotypes which directly applies to the prejudicial aspect. However this theory does not present an understanding of the crisis element. Building on social identity, uncertainty reduction aptly addresses the prejudicial aspect but only generally broaches the crisis element. The theory refers to many types of uncertainty or obstructions in the natural environment, but it does not specifically focus on violent crimes. Terror management on the other hand, specifically refers to both the crisis and prejudice elements, in that the theory accounts for prejudicial responses to violent crises. Yet, even terror management is incomplete in its explanation of the formation of stereotypes, prejudicial behavior and discrimination. Though the theory attempts to describe the process, with ideas of proximal and distal responses, it does not provide a substantial and precise cognitive explanation. Therefore for one to achieve a full understanding of post-crisis prejudice one needs to consider the concepts in all three theories.

With a conceptual framework in place one can probe deeper and begin to view post-crisis prejudice on a more micro-level. How do personality variations factor into this phenomenon? Social identity and uncertainty-identity have been tested in a variety of conditions but little research has been done to explore how personality differences might produce different results. Pyszczynski, Solomon and Greenberg assert in, In the Wake of 9/11: The Psychology of Terror, that the distal defense mechanism caused many people to perform altruistic and pro-social behavior and encouraged others to search for life meaning. Yet, they do not state what led to the
diversity of responses. What made one American man try to run over an Islamic woman with his car (Human Rights Watch, 2002) while his fellow citizen ran to assist the firemen at ground zero (Pyszczynski, Solomon & Greenberg, 2003)? Being able to isolate personality differences is a vital and worthy pursuit as it would yield a further understanding of what leads to pro-social and anti-social behavior in the aftermath of crises.

Applying John Bowlby’s attachment theory (1969) could provide a fuller understanding of responses to crisis, as the theory is concerned with children’s reactions to distress and alarm. Bowlby’s work with mothers and newborns in the 1940s compelled him to develop a theory that explained children’s attachments to their mothers as a survival strategy. Bowlby theorized that bonds develop between the child and its mother and when these bonds are broken the child experiences a catastrophic loss. This loss affects later personality development and behavior patterns in the child (Bowlby, 1969; 1973).

Mary Ainsworth a student of Bowlby, expanded on attachment theory by identifying different attachment styles. Such patterns were identified in the *strange situation* experiments (Ainsworth, Blehar, Waters & Wall, 1978). These experiments involved observing infants in their interactions with their mothers in a procedure that consisted of eight episodes. First, parent and infant are familiarized to the experimental room. Second, parent and infant are left alone in the room and the parent watches as the infant explores alone. Third, a stranger (the experimenter) enters, engages in a conversation with the parent and approaches the infant while the parent discreetly leaves. Fourth, the stranger plays with the infant, while the parent is absent from the room. Fifth, the parent returns to the room, greets and comforts the child after which both the parent and stranger leave the room. Sixth, the infant is left alone in the room. Seventh,
the stranger returns and plays with the infant. Eighth, the parent returns, greets the infant and picks up the infant as the stranger discreetly leaves.

Based on the filmed reactions of the infant to each of these steps, especially to the mother’s return in step eight, Ainsworth developed three classifications: secure, ambivalent/resistant/preoccupied, and avoidant/dismissing. The first category represented infants with a secure attachment as they exhibited anxiety when the parent was absent but were reassured when the parent returned and engaged in play. Preoccupied infants, the second category, greeted the parent and refused to leave the parent and return to play. In the third category, the dismissive infants ignored the return of the parent and continued to play with their toys. Later research by Main and Solomon (1986) found that there was a fourth category. Infants in this category were referred to as disorganized and exhibited inconsistencies when approaching the parent after the parent’s return. Instead of clinging to or dismissing the parent, infants in this category started to approach but then quickly receded or froze in the middle of their approach.

Attachment theory was explored subsequently among romantic partners, in therapist-patient relationships, and most recently in business settings. Diana Fosha (2000) summarized much of the adult literature in terms of a two dimensional scheme, with one dimension being adults’ abilities to recognize and understand their feelings, and the other, the ability to respond to negative stimuli without being overwhelmed by anxiety. A version of Fosha’s paradigm is represented in Appendix B and illustrates the four attachment styles that can be derived from crossing the two dimensions. The north/south continuum corresponds to people’s ability to feel (can/cannot feel) and the east/west continuum relates to people’s ability to respond to negative conditions with minimal anxiety (can/cannot deal).
Those in the top right quadrant are considered secure and autonomous. People with this attachment style are capable of understanding their own feelings and responding adaptively to negative stimuli. Adults in this category were reared by parents who provided consistent emotional and physical support and simultaneously allowed them to explore the world. Secure adults are capable of controlling their emotions and seek a further understanding of the world and other people.

The top left quadrant represents those with an insecure-preoccupied style. These people are capable of feeling but not capable of functioning when faced with pain or difficult challenges. Adults in this category were most often raised by parents who were incapable of controlling their own responses to strongly negative events and were also raised by parents’ with erratic parenting styles. This caused the children to become preoccupied with the state of the parent. Preoccupied children were forced to live in a state of uncertainty not knowing whether the parent would be present or absent or comforting or abusive. This state of confusion prevented these children from learning how to respond adaptively to emotionally negative conditions and how to be vigilant in demanding and relying on support from authority figures.

People with insecure-dismissive styles are placed in the bottom right quadrant. Adults with this style are capable of dealing with negative stimuli but are unaware of their feelings. Parents of insecure-dissmisives, raised their children without displaying emotion. These children learned to embrace a stoical style of coping and therefore minimized the importance of emotions and the feelings of others. The final quadrant on the bottom left exhibits those with unresolved-disorganized styles. People in this category are incapable of feeling or dealing. Raised by parents, who were themselves emotionally disorganized and who left them without a consistent
strategy for securing support, these people have difficulty controlling their responses to pain and are unaware of their feelings and the feelings of others.

These styles, if mapped onto the September 11th responses, suggest an interesting variety of behavior patterns. Starting with the secure attachment style, one could surmise that people in this category would be able to cope after the initial shock subsided. Their resilience would help them overcome the pain of the events and their capability of feeling would predict possible prosocial behavior. Furthermore these people might even inquire into the motivations of the terrorists, as they have a strong ability to empathize. Eventually adults with a secure attachment would intellectually come to an understanding of the events and be able to move on with their daily lives.

Those with an insecure-dismissing attachment style would possibly view the event in an opportunistic light. These people would cope with the confusion by exploiting the situation for their own gain, unaware or at least unmoved by the emotional dimension of the event and its impact on others emotional worlds. Such people might belong to media groups, the government or bank trading floors. The decision by government officials to invade Afghanistan and later Iraq could be perceived as a dismissive reaction. These government officials coldly deduced that an effective prevention of future attacks would be to invade nearby countries with similar political interests. Without considering the innocent people who would be destroyed in the process, these officials voted to initiate war. Additionally media personnel generated high ratings in the face of the event without much concern of the grieving mourners. Those in the banking industry, present a glaring resemblance to the dismissive style. Bankers and traders who heavily invested in oil and military related stocks exhibited a great ability to cope and an incredible ability to disregard emotions.
The third style of insecure-preoccupied parallels those who were highly susceptible to stereotype and discriminate against Arabs, Muslims and Middle-Easterners. Insecure-preoccupied individuals might arguably be those most susceptible to the dynamics discussed in the rest of this paper because of their high experience of anxiety and uncertainty in the face of crises, phenomena directly linked by the researchers discussed in preceding sections to the urge to stereotype, categorize and discriminate. Perhaps the man who killed Ahmed was acting out of an insecure-preoccupied style. In trying to cope with the terror these people acted out in vengeance and exhibited discriminatory behavior.

In the last group, those with an insecure-disorganized base were incapable of emotionally reacting in a coherent way and responded to the havoc that the attacks wrought. These people presumably were paralyzed by the events. It was arguably this effect that the terrorists were aiming for when they targeted the United States. By interpreting the reactions to September 11th through an attachment theory lens, one can glean an even closer understanding of the contributory factors involved in post-crisis prejudice.

It is notable to mention that there is research linking attachment theory to theories of prejudice and in-group out-group bias (Mikulincer & Shaver, 2001). Yet even more interesting is the recent research mapping terror management to attachment theory (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Cox, et al., 2008). Specifically researchers have found that attachment style moderates subjects’ reactions to stressful situations, particularly the fear of death. For instance subjects with secure attachment styles failed to enlist a worldview defense after having been primed with mortality salience. Subjects with avoidant (dismissive) and anxious-ambivalent (preoccupied) styles were found to heavily rely on the worldview defense as a defense to death reminders. These findings provide evidence for the notion that people with secure attachment styles are least
likely to partake in prejudicial and discriminatory behavior, whereas those with insecure styles are most likely to indulge in the negative behaviors (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000). In Cox et al. (2008) researchers looked at groups with secure and insecure attachment styles, primed them with mortality salience and asked them to recall interactions with their parents. The researchers found that those with secure styles were able to buffer their fear and anxiety of fear of death by recalling their close relationships. Conversely those with unsecure styles were not able to protect themselves with the symbolic shield of a close relationship.

Appendix C displays the intersection between attachment styles and stress/fear of death defense strategies. The model also plots examples of September 11th responses onto the four attachment styles. This mapping represents the fluidity in which these theories complement each other and their relevance to September 11th responses.

Combining the salient pieces of social identity, uncertainty reduction, terror management and attachment theory we can see the formation of stereotypes, the conditions that lead to prejudice and even the probable personality types that would exhibit discrimination. The alarming statistics and horrific accounts presented in this paper provide a powerful case for need for further research of post-crisis prejudice and how it can be prevented.

This paper begins the exploration of post-crisis prejudice by offering theoretical explanations for the formation of the phenomenon. Yet we must drive forward and research ways in which post-crisis prejudice can be reduced or averted entirely. Studies have shown that those with secure attachment styles do not engage in prejudicial and discriminatory behavior after crises (Mikulincer & Florian, 2000; Cox, et al., 2008), rather they exhibit altruistic behavior such as volunteering with aid relief efforts. Conducting a close investigation of those who exhibited altruistic behavior after crises could yield interesting results. For instance researchers could look
at the possibility of altruistic respondents having been exposed to speeches or discussions instructing them to reach out to loved ones. Though this idea has been supported by studies conducted in labs (ibid.) having real life data could help to spur a new stream of research that looks at the affect of security attachment priming with real victims.

Additionally researchers should look at the affects of the speeches that President Bush and then Mayor Giuliani made immediately after the attacks. Both leaders were temporarily successful in their request that Americans treat Arab and Muslim Americans with respect and refrain from associating them with the terrorists (Nacos & Torres-Reyna, 2006). Had the leaders amplified this message and broadcasted it for a longer time period perhaps they would have prevented much of the prejudice that ensued after the attacks. The media and leaders can capitalize on the chance to aid in the alleviation of post-crisis conflict by distributing stereotypic disconfirming statements. Since crises are inevitable and unavoidable, it is incumbent upon us to discover new areas of research that investigate the mitigation of post-crisis prejudice, enabling all victims have an equal opportunity to a healthy recovery.

**References**


