Economics Research Seminar

Wage bargaining with direct competition and heterogeneous access to vacancies

Sponsored by: Economics Department

Speaker(s): Theodore L. Turocy, Ph.D.

Date & Time: Friday, April 11 from 2 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.

Agents with a richer set of opportunities to trade should be able to demand better terms of trade.  For instance, workers who are otherwise equally-qualified may differ in their access to vacancies, e.g. because their social networks are larger or smaller. We present a model of search and matching in which multiple workers may be matched to the same vacancy, and workers compete directly in the wage bargining process. Workers with greater access have a higher dynamic outside option and demand higher wages. They are therefore unsuccessful candidates in some matches; this latter outcome is not possible in existing models based on Nash bargaining to determine wages.  In particular, when markets are tight and the expected length of a position is short, workers with
better access to opportunities will remain unemployed longer than those with less access.

Please join the Economics Department for a research seminar.  This event is open to all Case Western Reserve University faculty, Ph.D. students, economic majors and minors, and those interested in economics research.
 
Contact Information:

Teresa Kabat
teresa.kabat@case.edu
216.368.4110

Location
Peter B. Lewis Building, Room 118
11119 Bellflower Road
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235
United States

Attachment: Wage bargaining with direct competition

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