Economics Research Seminar
Wage bargaining with direct competition and heterogeneous access to vacancies
Sponsored by: Economics Department
Speaker(s): Theodore L. Turocy, Ph.D.
Date & Time: Friday, April 11 from 2 p.m. to 3:30 p.m.
Agents with a richer set of opportunities to trade should be able to demand better terms of trade. For instance, workers who are otherwise equally-qualified may differ in their access to vacancies, e.g. because their social networks are larger or smaller. We present a model of search and matching in which multiple workers may be matched to the same vacancy, and workers compete directly in the wage bargining process. Workers with greater access have a higher dynamic outside option and demand higher wages. They are therefore unsuccessful candidates in some matches; this latter outcome is not possible in existing models based on Nash bargaining to determine wages. In particular, when markets are tight and the expected length of a position is short, workers with
better access to opportunities will remain unemployed longer than those with less access.
Please join the Economics Department for a research seminar. This event is open to all Case Western Reserve University faculty, Ph.D. students, economic majors and minors, and those interested in economics research.
Peter B. Lewis Building, Room 118
11119 Bellflower Road
Cleveland, OH 44106-7235
Attachment: Wage bargaining with direct competition