Economics Research Seminar
Incomplete Contracts, Unemployment, and Labor Market Segmentation
Sponsored by: Economics Department
Speaker(s): David Huffman, Swarthmore College
Date & Time: Oct 11, 2012 4 PM - 5:30 PM (Eastern)
Room 201, Peter B. Lewis Building
Please join the Economics Department for a research seminar. This event is open to all Case faculty, Ph.D. students, economic majors and minors, and those interested in economics research. Contact Teresa Kabat at email@example.com or 216.368.4110 for additional information.
This paper provides evidence that two important features of labor markets - the existence of involuntary unemployment, adn the segmentation of markets into firms offering "good" and "bad" job - may have a common underlying cause. In particular, in the prevalent case that work effort is not verificable, the implicity contracting strategies adopted by firms may simultaneously generate involuntary unemployment, and labor market segmentation.